Author: rembaumlaw

Golf course communities are a fact of life in south Florida. But what happens when the course becomes too expensive to maintain? Sometimes, what started out as a voluntary club membership becomes mandatory for new owners. This can have obvious negative effects on sales due to the added expenses of the mandatory club membership. To avoid that consequence, more than one golf course community has sold memberships to non-association members. Others sell the golf course to a developer for space to build new homes. This can have multiple positive effects on an association’s cash flow. It eliminates the ever increasing costs of maintaining the golf course, provides new members who will be paying assessments, and results in a huge cash infusion to the association when the sale closes. But, it’s not all a panacea as there are significant hurdles that must be first overcome. Avid golf club members might launch a legal fight to keep their club, despite the economic hurdles. Local zoning and development codes may have certain restrictions. Golf course communities may also have restrictive covenants preventing other uses for the golf course.

The average 18-hole golf course comprises at least 74 acres and many modern courses are built on 150 acres. At 5 homes per acre, this means the average 74 acre course can be used to build 370 new single family homes not including other infrastructure needs such as new roads, green-space, and retention ponds, etc. That said, it does not take a rocket scientist to see the profits that can be made.
In a recent case Victorville West Limited Partnership v. The Inverrary Association, Inc., decided August 23, 2017 by Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal, the developer, Victorville, sought to cancel a restrictive covenant because the golf course was no longer profitable. Victorville wanted to allow non-association members into the golf club. The restrictive covenant in force since 1971, provided that,
“The [Golf Course] shall henceforth be used solely for recreational purposes, including all sports as defined herein, and for the Facilities and amenities appurtenant thereto, such as clubhouses and recreational, maintenance, and storage facilities and equipment. For the purposes of this Declaration, the term “sports” shall be deemed to include, by way of illustration and not in limitation thereof, the following:  Golf, tennis, horseback riding, swimming and all such other recreational activities as may be appropriate and in keeping with the overall development of Inverrary․ … Developer agrees that… it will not at any such time offer, sell, or admit to golf membership any persons or families not then bona fide residents of Inverrary.”
In 2006, Victorville purchased the golf course “subject to all covenants listed in the Public Records of Broward County, Florida” which included this covenant. It asked the Association to hold a membership vote to cancel the covenant. The Association refused because, even though its members were not purchasing sufficient club memberships, its members liked the golf course, even if they did not have a membership, because it provided a tranquil view, prevented overcrowding, and preserved the nature of the community.
In 2012, Victorville filed a lawsuit against the Association and argued that the covenant was an economic hardship. The trial court found that Victorville’s claim was time-barred because the statute of limitations began to run when it purchased the golf course and it did not bring its claim within the five-year statutory limit. The trial court also held that, even if the statute of limitations had not run, Victorville was not entitled to vacate the restrictive covenant because the covenant remained beneficial to the surrounding community. As a result, Victorville appealed.

On appeal, Victorville argued that the trial court should have nullified the restrictive covenant due to a substantial change in circumstances that prevented the covenant’s original purpose from being carried out and the covenant was an unlawful restraint on alienation (meaningful and unlawful restraint on the transfer of real property). The appellate court reviewed the trial court’s findings of fact under what is called “the clearly erroneous standard of review” meaning that their review was “de novo”. A de novo review allows the appellate court to review all of the evidence anew and substitute its opinion for that of the trial court.
The appellate court noted that, “in an action to cancel a restrictive covenant the test is whether or not the covenant is valid on the basis that the original intention of the parties can be carried out despite alleged materially changed conditions or, on the other hand, whether the covenant is invalid because changed conditions have frustrated the object of the covenant without fault or neglect on the part of the party who seeks to be relieved from the restrictions…although few Inverrary residents have memberships at the golf course, the golf course preserves the character of the community and provides residents with a pleasant view. These are reasonable objectives of a restrictive covenant.” Therefore, the appellate court held that, “even if the golf course is failing financially, the covenant must be enforced because it remains a substantial value to the surrounding residences, the dominant estates.”

The appellate court noted that nothing in the covenant reflected an “intent for the golf course to be a profitable enterprise…. Victorville’s financial hardships do not support cancellation of the covenant because ‘the law does not permit cancellation of property restrictions for the purpose of accommodating the best or most profitable use of a particular piece of property affected by the restriction.’” In citing to another case, the appellate court also noted that “the law does not permit cancellation of property restrictions for the purpose of accommodating the best or most profitable use of a particular piece of property affected by the restriction.”

Victorville argued that the covenant was akin to a perpetual covenant because the two-thirds vote necessary to revoke the covenant could never be obtained. The appellate court found that “the duration of the covenant is significant though not perpetual because the covenant may be removed by a two-thirds vote of surrounding homeowners.”
The appellate court did, however, differ with the trial court’s opinion that the five-year statute of limitations had run and, in fact, found that this part of the trial court’s opinion was “error.” The appellate court did not agree that the statute of limitations began to run when Victorville acquired the property. Rather, the appellate court explained that “the statute of limitations begins to run when the action may be brought…. for the statute of limitations to have begun to run when Victorville purchased the golf course, a substantial change in circumstances would have had to have taken place before Victorville purchased the property.”

To recap, while the appellate court disagreed with the trial court’s statute of limitations rational, it still agreed with the trial court’s outcome because the covenant at issue remained a substantial benefit to the surrounding homeowners and was not an unlawful restraint on alienation.

Generally speaking, as a result of sections 720.3085 and 718.116, Florida Statutes, lenders who acquire property as a result of their own foreclosure of their first mortgage against their borrower only owe the association the lesser of 12 months back assessments or 1% of the initial mortgage, whichever is less. This is referred to as the lender’s “safe harbor” obligation. But, if the lender refuses to make timely payment to the association, is the lender also responsible for the costs and fees incurred by the association or is the lender only responsible for the “safe harbor” obligation? This was at issue in Emerald Estates Community Association v. U. S. Bank National Association, as decided by Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal on April 4, 2018.

Ultimately, U.S. Bank paid Emerald Estates Community Association the “safe harbor” monies it owed. Under protest, it also paid the costs and attorney’s fees incurred and demanded by the association for its collection efforts associated with the unpaid assessments. Then, U.S. Bank filed a lawsuit against the association. U.S. Bank asserted it was only required to pay the 12 months of unpaid assessments that accrued prior to the bank taking title and demanded reimbursement of the costs and attorney’s fees associated with the association’s collection efforts that were incurred due to the unpaid assessments that accrued after U.S. Bank acquired title. The trial court agreed with U.S. Bank and granted a summary judgment in its favor. (A trial court grants a “motion for summary judgement”, when there are no disputed material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgement as a matter of law.) In granting U.S. Bank’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court reasoned that the association was not permitted to charge for costs and attorney’s fees that accrued prior to U.S. Bank taking title. Thereafter, the association appealed the trial court’s decision.

While the appellate court agreed with the trial court’s aforementioned position, that the association was not permitted to charge for costs and attorney’s fees that accrued prior to U.S. Bank taking title, the appellate court also correctly noted that the association was claiming reimbursement for costs and attorney’s fees incurred in its collection efforts associated with the unpaid assessments which accrued after U.S. Bank acquired title.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reasoned that when the motion for summary judgment decided in favor of U.S. Bank was granted by the trial court, a genuine issue of material fact did, in fact, exist as to whether the association’s requested costs and attorney’s fees associated with the unpaid assessments accrued before or after U.S. Bank acquired the property. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the entry of the trial court’s summary judgment and remanded the case back to the trial court so a determination could be made as to when the association incurred the costs and attorney’s fees it demanded U.S. Bank pay – before or after U.S. Bank took title.

What can be gleaned from the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s decision? If the appellate court did not believe that U.S. Bank could be responsible for the association’s attorney’s fees and costs that were incurred after U.S. Bank acquired title, then the appellate court would not have remanded the case back to the trial court. Sadly, the case does not address whether U.S. Bank, in addition to not paying its “safe harbor” obligation, also failed to pay the regular assessments that came due after U.S. Bank acquired ownership of the property. Nevertheless, without addressing it head on, this appellate court decision strongly infers that if a first mortgage lender acquires title as a result of its own foreclosure, and then the lender fails to timely pay its “safe harbor” obligation, and likely other assessments that came due after the lender acquired title, too, then the lender is responsible for the association’s attorney’s fees and costs incurred in its collection/foreclosure efforts against the lender.

In addition to House Bill 841, containing this year’s community association legislation, as discussed in prior articles, there are several other pieces of legislation that have made their way through the 2018 Florida legislative session and are now signed into law by Governor Scott that affect, or are of interest to, community associations. The following is a digest explanation of some of these newest laws:

MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT
House Bill 617. Approved by Governor 3/21/2018. Effective 10/1/2018

It is clarified that Part III of Chapter 720, Florida Statutes, is intended to provide mechanisms for the revitalization of covenants or restrictions for all types of communities and property associations and is not solely limited to residential communities. In plain English, this means that commercial associations can both preserve and revitalize their covenants. As such, and as you will read below, the terms used in other statutory sections affected by this change are also changed. A new summary process to preserve the covenants is also included in the legislation.

Short Title – Chapter 712 of the Florida Statutes is given the short title, “Marketable Record Title Act.”

Definitions – Terms and definitions were added and revised to the Marketable Record Title Act.

The new term “community covenant or restriction” is defined to mean any agreement or limitation contained in a document recorded in the public records of the county in which a parcel is located which subjects the parcel to any use restriction that may be enforced by a property owners’ association or authorizes a property owners’ association to impose a charge or assessment against the parcel or the parcel owner.

The term “homeowners’ association” is replaced by the term “property owners’ association” which term also includes a corporation or other entity responsible for the operation of property in which the voting membership is made up of the owners of the property and/or their agents and membership is a mandatory condition of property ownership.

The definition for the term “parcel” is revised to remove the requirement that the real property be residential and be subject to exclusive ownership.

Finally, the definition for the term “covenant or restriction” was simplified to remove reference to enforcement of such covenant or restriction by a homeowners’ association or the Florida Department of Environmental Protection and authorization of a homeowners’ association to impose a charge or assessment against the parcel or the parcel owner.

Preservation of Covenants Process – Any person claiming an interest in land or other right subject to extinguishment under the Marketable Record Title Act will be able to preserve such right by filing a written notice in accordance with the Marketable Record Title Act at any time during the 30-year period immediately following the effective date of the root of title. As to a property owners’ association, preservation may be accomplished in one of three ways:

1. by filing a written notice in accordance with the Marketable Record Title Act, which is a process currently available;

2. by filing a summary notice in accordance with section 720.3032(2), Florida Statutes, (a new statute); or

3. by filing an amendment to a covenant or restriction indexed under the legal name of the property owners’ association which references the recording information of the covenant or restriction being preserved.

In the event a summary notice or amendment filing is not “indexed” to the current owners of the property affected by the preservation, the validity of the summary notice or the amendment to protect the covenants or restrictions is not affected.

An association is no longer required to mail a seven-day notice to the members providing the statement of marketable title action and the association’s board is no longer required to approve the preservation.

At the first board meeting, excluding the organizational meeting, which follows the annual meeting of the members, the board must consider the desirability of filing notices to preserve the covenants or restrictions affecting the community or association from extinguishment under the Marketable Record Title Act and to authorize and direct the appropriate officer to file notice in accordance with section 720.3032, Florida Statutes. This was added as a constant reminder to Boards to prevent inadvertent extinguishment of existing covenants.

As to the existing “notice” method to preserve, the requirements of what must be in the notice have been clarified and revised to reflect and accommodate the newly defined terms.

As to the new method of preservation by summary notice, a new section 720.3032(2), Florida Statutes, is created to provide for preservation by the recording of a summary notice containing the following information:

• The legal name of the association.

• The mailing and physical addresses of the association.

• The names of the affected subdivision plats and condominiums or, if not applicable, the common name of the community.

• The name, address, and telephone number for the current community association management company or community association manager, if any.

• Indication as to whether the association desires to preserve the covenants or restrictions affecting the community or association from extinguishment under the Marketable Record Title Act.

• A listing by name and recording information of those covenants or restrictions affecting the community which the association desires to be preserved from extinguishment.

• The legal description of the community affected by the covenants or restrictions, which may be satisfied by a reference to a recorded plat.

• The signature of a duly authorized officer of the association, acknowledged in the same manner as deeds are acknowledged for record.

This new section provides a form which satisfies the required information, as set out above. The originally executed notice must be recorded in the official records of the applicable circuit court clerk or county. A copy of the notice, as recorded, must be included with the next meeting notice or other mailing to all members.

Revitalization of Covenants – A new section 712.12 is added to the Marketable Record Title Act regarding the revitalization of covenants by parcel owners who are not subject to a homeowners’ association.

This new section sets out its own defined terms, including the term “parcel,” which, unlike for the preservation of covenants, is required to be residential and subject to exclusive ownership.

The term “covenant or restriction,” which is defined to mean any agreement or limitation imposed by a private party and not required by a governmental agency as a condition of a development permit which is contained in a document recorded in the public records of the county in which a parcel is located and which subjects the parcel to any use restriction that may be enforced by a parcel owner.

This new section allows for the revitalization of covenants by parcel owners who are not subject to a homeowners’ association by the same revitalization procedures as applicable to a homeowners’ association, except that there is no need to reference a homeowners’ association or articles of incorporation or bylaws of a homeowners’ association.

The approval necessary to revitalize must be in writing, and not at a meeting.

An organizing committee, as opposed to the president and secretary of a homeowners’ association, may execute the revitalized covenants or restrictions; and the community name in the covenants or restrictions are indexed as the grantee and the parcel owners are indexed as the grantors.

Newly created owner rights – The owner of a parcel that has ceased to be governed by covenants or restrictions as of October 1, 2018 may commence an action by October 1, 2019 for a judicial determination that the covenants or restrictions did not govern that parcel as of October 1, 2018 and that any revitalization of such covenants or restrictions as to that parcel would unconstitutionally deprive the parcel owner of rights or property. Revitalization of covenants or restrictions against the parcel after such judicial determination is not affective against the parcel, and the rights of the parcel owner so recognized may not be subsequently altered by revived covenants or restrictions without the consent of the affected parcel owner.

SURPLUS LANDS BEING SOLD BY WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT
House Bill 703. Approved by Governor 3/23/2018. Effective 7/1/2018.

Notice of Intention to Sell Surplus Land – In addition to providing newspaper notice of its intention to sell surplus land, a water management district must also publish such notice on its website. The first publication of the notice must occur at least 30 days, nor more than 360 days, before any sale is approved by the district.

Adjacent Property Owners – Certain surplus lands may be offered for sale to “adjacent land owners,” meaning, those owners whose property abuts the surplus lands. If the surplus lands are offered for sale to adjacent property owners, notice of the intention to sell need only be published once and must be sent to the adjacent property owners by certified mail and published on the district’s website. If the surplus lands are not sold to an adjacent property owner, the district may sell the lands at any time to the general public for the highest price obtainable.

House Bill 841 containing this year’s community association legislation (“HB 841” or “Bill”) has made its way through the 2018 Florida legislative session and was signed into law by Governor Scott on March 23rd. As the Bill is now signed into law, it becomes effective on July 1, 2018. The following is a digest explanation of these newest laws to affect Florida’s community associations:

Condominium Official Record-keeping: Certain official records must be permanently maintained from the inception of the association, including the following:

(i) a copy of the plans, permits, warranties, and other items provided by the developer;
(ii) a copy of the recorded declaration of condominium and all amendments thereto
(iii) a copy of the recorded bylaws and all amendments thereto;
(iv) a certified copy of the articles of incorporation and all amendments thereto;
(v) a copy of the current rules; and
(vi) all meeting minutes.

All other official records of the association must be maintained within the state for at least seven years, unless otherwise provided by general law. Notwithstanding, all election records, including electronic election records, must only be maintained for one year from the election.

Condominium Website: As a result of the 2017 legislative session, the website posting requirement applies to condominiums containing 150 or more non-timeshare units. The deadline to post digital copies of the governing documents, association contracts, budget, financial report, and other required documents on the association’s website is extended to January 1, 2019. Of the documents to be posted to the website, a list of bids received by the association within the past year for contracts entered into by the association and any monthly income and expense statement must also be posted. Notwithstanding this requirement, the failure to post these documents on the website does not, in and of itself, invalidate any action or decision of the association. Additionally, in complying with the posting requirement, there is no liability for disclosing information that is protected or restricted unless such disclosure was made with a knowing or intentional disregard of the protected or restricted nature of such information.

Condominium Financial Reporting: In the event an association fails to comply with an order by the Division of Florida Condominiums, Timeshares, and Mobile Homes to provide an owner with a copy of the financial report within a specified amount of days, then the association is prohibited from waiving the financial reporting requirement for the fiscal year in which the owner’s initial request for a copy was made and for the following fiscal year, too.

Condominium/Cooperative Board Meeting Notices: Notice of any board meeting in which regular or special assessments against unit owners are to be considered must specifically state that assessments will be considered and provide the estimated cost and description of the purposes for such assessments.

Condominium/Cooperative Meeting Notices: The association may adopt a rule for conspicuously posting meeting notices and agendas on the association’s website for at least the minimum period of time for which a notice of a meeting is also required to be physically posted on the condominium property. This rule must include a requirement that the association send an electronic notice in the same manner as a notice for a meeting of the members, including a hyperlink to the website where the notice is posted. (As yet, it is not patently clear whether this is in place of the existing “posting in a conspicuous place” requirement or in lieu of it. The safer course of action is to do both.)

Condominium Director Term: A director can serve a term longer than one year if permitted by the bylaws or articles of incorporation. However, a director cannot serve more than eight consecutive years, unless approved by two-thirds of all votes cast in the election or unless there are not enough eligible candidates to fill vacancies on the board. This part of the legislation replaces and fixes last year’s ridiculous new law that a director could not serve more than four consecutive two-year terms. (It appears that based on this year’s legislative changes, directors can serve any length of term so long as authorized by the articles or bylaws. At present, directors can only serve one or two year terms depending on the provisions of the articles and bylaws. Also, staggered terms remain permitted.)

Condominium/Cooperative Electronic Notice: A unit owner who consents to receiving notices by electronic transmission is solely responsible for removing or bypassing filters that block receipt of mass emails sent to members on behalf of the association in the course of giving electronic notices.

Condominium Director Recall: A recall is only effective if it is facially valid. (Of course, as what the term of art “facially valid” is intended to mean is left out of the legislation.) In any event, if the recall is determined to be facially invalid by the board, then the unit owner representative of the recall effort may file a petition challenging the board’s determination on facial validity. Similarly, a recalled board member may file a petition challenging the facial validity of the recall effort. If the arbitrator determines that the recall was invalid, the petitioning board member is immediately reinstated and the recall is null and void. In some instances, the arbitrator may award prevailing party attorney fees.

Condominium Material Alterations: In situations where the declaration as amended does not specify the procedure for approving material alterations or substantial additions to the common elements or association property, the already statutorily required approval of seventy-five percent of the total voting interests of the association must now be obtained before the material alterations or substantial additions to the common elements or association property are commenced. (Clearly then, if the declaration is silent as to the procedure for material alterations or substantial additions to common elements or association property, this new legislation implies that a curative vote of the members to approve the changes is a thing of the past. It does not make sense to force the association to restore the property to its prior condition where the members might vote to approve the change. Hopefully, this will be fixed in next year’s legislative proposals.)

Condominium Electric Vehicles: A declaration of condominium or restrictive covenant may not prohibit or be enforced so as to prohibit any unit owner from installing an electric vehicle charging station within the boundaries of the unit owner’s limited common element parking area. Moreover, the board may not prohibit a unit owner from installing an electric vehicle charging station for an electric vehicle within the boundaries of his or her limited common element parking area. The unit owner is entirely responsible for the charging station, including its installation, maintenance, utilities charges (which must be separately metered), insurance, and removal if no longer needed. The association may impose certain requirements upon the installation and operation of the charging station, including, for example, that the unit owner comply with all safety requirements and building codes, that the unit owner comply with reasonable architectural standards adopted by the association governing charging stations, and that the unit owner use the services of a licensed and registered electrical contractor or engineer knowledgeable in charging stations. Labor performed on or materials furnished for the installation of a charging station may not be the basis for filing a construction lien against the association, but such a lien may be filed against the unit owner.

Condominium Director Conflicts of Interest: The process allowing a director to enter into a contract with the director’s association has become better organized. Disclosure requirements that were set out in section 718.3026(3), Florida Statutes were deleted from that location and relocated to section 718.3027, Florida Statutes. In brief, directors and officers of non-timeshare condominiums must disclose to the board any activity that could be reasonably considered a conflict of interest. A rebuttable presumption of such a conflict exists if:

i) directors or officers of the association (including their relatives) enter into a contract for goods or services with the association;

ii) directors or officers of the association (including their relatives) holds an interest in a corporation. Limited liability corporation, partnership or other business entity that conducts business with the association.

In the event of such a conflict, then the proposed activity and all relevant contracts must be attached to the meeting agenda and the requirements of section 617.0832, Florida Statutes must be adhered to, as well. The relevant provisions of section 617.0832, Florida Statutes follow:

“No contract or other transaction between a corporation and one or more of its directors or any other corporation, firm, association, or entity in which one or more of its directors are directors or officers or are financially interested shall be either void or voidable because of such relationship or interest, because such director or directors are present at the meeting of the board of directors or a committee thereof which authorizes, approves, or ratifies such contract or transaction, or because his or her or their votes are counted for such purpose, if:

a) The fact of such relationship or interest is disclosed or known to the board of directors or committee which authorizes, approves, or ratifies the contract or transaction by a vote or consent sufficient for the purpose without counting the votes or consents of such interested directors;

b) The fact of such relationship or interest is disclosed or known to the members entitled to vote on such contract or transaction, if any, and they authorize, approve, or ratify it by vote or written consent; or

c) The contract or transaction is fair and reasonable as to the corporation at the time it is authorized by the board, a committee, or the members.”

In addition, section 718.3027, Florida Statutes, provides that the disclosures required by this section must be set out in the meeting minutes, and the contract must be approved by two-thirds of all of the directors present (excluding the conflicted director). At the next membership meeting, the existence of the contract must be disclosed to the members and then may be canceled by a majority vote of the members present. If the contract is canceled, the association is only liable for the reasonable value of the goods and services provided up to the time of cancellation and is not liable for any termination fee, liquidated damages, or other form of penalty for such cancellation. Finally, in the event of a failure to disclose a conflict or potential conflict, the contract is voidable and terminates upon the filing of a written notice terminating the contract which contains at least 20 percent of the voting interests of the association. (Note that section 718.112(2)(p) Florida Statutes, pertaining to service provider contracts still provides that “an association, which is not a timeshare condominium association, may not employ or contract with any service provider that is owned or operated by a board member or with any person who has a financial relationship with a board member or officer, or a relative within the third degree of consanguinity by blood or marriage of a board member or officer. This paragraph does not apply to a service provider in which a board member or officer, or a relative within the third degree of consanguinity by blood or marriage of a board member or officer, owns less than 1 percent of the equity shares.”)

Condominium/Cooperative Grievance Committee: The grievance committee appointed by the board to conduct hearings for fines and use right suspensions for violations of the governing documents must be comprised of at least three members who are not officers, directors, or employees of the association, or the spouse, parent, child, brother, or sister of an officer, director, or employee. (The restriction against not allowing someone living with the director from serving on the committee was removed.) The fine or suspension can only be imposed if approved by a majority of the committee. If a fine is approved, the fine payment is due five days after the date of the committee meeting at which the fine is approved. (This seems illogical in that the offending member may not have received the required written notice of the confirmation of the fine from the association.) The association must provide written notice of the approved fine or suspension by mail or hand delivery.

Cooperative Official Records: The official records must be made available to a unit owner within ten working days after receipt of written request by the board or its designee.

Cooperative Director/Officer Eligibility: In a residential cooperative association of more than ten units, co-owners of a unit may not serve as members of the board at the same time unless the co-owners own more than one unit or unless there are not enough eligible candidates to fill the vacancies on the board at the time of the vacancy.

Cooperative Director/Officer Financial Delinquency: A director or officer more than 90 days delinquent in the payment of any monetary obligation due to the association shall be deemed to have abandoned the office, creating a vacancy in the office to be filled according to law.

Cooperative Bulk Communication Contracts: Cooperatives are now lawfully permitted to enter into bulk communication contracts which can include internet services and such expenses are deemed common expenses of the cooperative.

HOA/Cooperative Board Email Use: Members of the board may use email as a means of communication but may not cast a vote on an association matter via email.

HOA Fines: If a fine levied by the board is approved by the grievance committee, the fine payment is due five days after the date of the committee meeting at which the fine is approved. (This seems illogical in that the offending member may not have received the required notice of the confirmation of the fine from the association.)

HOA Amendments: A proposal to amend the governing documents must contain the full text of the provision to be amended with new language underlined and deleted language stricken. However, if the proposed change is so extensive that underlining and striking through language would hinder, rather than assist, the understanding of the proposed amendment, the following notation must be inserted immediately preceding the proposed amendment: “Substantial rewording. See governing documents for current text.” An immaterial error or omission in the amendment process does not invalidate an otherwise properly adopted amendment. (In other words, HOA proposed amendments must be presented in the same manner as proposed condominium amendments have been required to do for years and years.)

HOA Election by Acclamation: If an election is not required because there are either an equal number or fewer qualified candidates than vacancies exist, and if nominations from the floor are not required and write-in nominations are not permitted, then such qualified candidates shall commence service on the board of directors, regardless of whether a quorum is attained at the annual meeting. (This is a major change!)

HOA Application of Payments: The application of assessment payments received by the association is applicable regardless of any purported accord and satisfaction or any restrictive endorsement, designation, or instruction placed on or accompanying a payment.

The termination and transitioning from one laundry vending company to another can be a dirty job. Rarely do companies fight as hard as laundry vending machine companies. While community associations should always ensure that their laundry lease with a laundry vending company includes clear termination provisions and specific obligations of the parties upon termination, the scenario as occurred in the case of CSC ServiceWorks, Inc. v. Boca Bayou Condominium Association, Inc. and Commercial Laundries, Inc., recently decided by Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal in its March 7, 2018 published opinion, could happen to any association. The lessons learned from this case are equally relevant to many other contract situations, too.

In this case, Boca Bayou Condominium Association, Inc. (“Association”) had a laundry lease with the laundry vending company, CSC ServiceWorks, Inc. (“CSC”). Pursuant to the laundry lease, CSC was to install commercial washers and dryers in the Association’s 26 laundry rooms and maintain them for an initial term of seven years. The laundry lease also contained a seriously noxious and repugnant “right of first refusal” provision which gave CSC the option to again lease the Association’s laundry rooms before the Association is allowed to enter into a lease with a different laundry vending company.

Upon the expiration of the initial seven-year term, the Association and CSC extended the laundry lease for an additional seven years. After the expiration of the extended seven-year term, CSC continued to lease the Association’s laundry rooms and have its washers and dryers in the Association’s laundry rooms on a month-to-month basis for almost two years. Around that time, the Association began receiving complaints from the residents.

Spurred by the resident’s complaints, the Association sought lease offers from several laundry vending companies, including CSC and Commercial Laundries, Inc. The Association decided to go with Commercial Laundries. As such, the Association then sent CSC a letter terminating its laundry lease and inquiring as to when CSC would come to disconnect and remove its washers and dryers from the Association’s laundry rooms.

Just over a week prior to Commercial Laundries’ scheduled delivery and installation of its washers and dryers, CSC informed the Association and Commercial Laundries that it was exercising its right of first refusal. However, CSC’s right of first refusal was denied by the Association.

After several attempts by both the Association and Commercial Laundries to have CSC remove its washers and dryers, CSC failed to remove its washers and dryers in time for Commercial Laundries to install its washers and dryers. As a result, when Commercial Laundries arrived at the Association’s condominium with its washers and dryers in tow, Commercial Laundries disconnected CSC’s washers and dryers from the water and electric hook-ups and moved them to the side of the laundry rooms for CSC’s removal. None of CSC’s washers and dryers were damaged in the process or removed from the Association’s laundry rooms. Also, CSC was welcome to go to the Association’s laundry rooms, which remained unlocked, to remove their washers and dryers at any time.

Due to CSC’s continued failure to remove its washers and dryers, the Association sent CSC a pre-suit demand letter providing that if CSC did not remove its washers and dryers within 15 days, the Association, as landlord, would evict CSC from the Association’s laundry rooms. Although CSC ultimately removed its washers and dryers in compliance with the Association’s letter, it was merely the beginning of its aggressive fight which resulted in a lawsuit being filed by CSC against the Association and Commercial Laundries for breach of the laundry lease, tortious interference, conversion, and unlawful detainer, which was the subject of this case.

At trial, CSC argued that disconnecting its washers and dryers without legal process or CSC’s knowledge or consent was tantamount to being ousted from the Association’s laundry rooms. In the end, the case was decided by a jury. Yes, that’s right, CSC’s dispute went to the jury. As an aside, think of the tens of thousands of dollars expended in legal fees and costs just to get to that point. The jury ultimately decided in favor of the Association and Commercial Laundries. Then CSC appealed and lost. Thus the trial court’s jury decision was upheld by Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal.

On appeal, CSC again argued that disconnecting its washers and dryers without legal process or CSC’s knowledge or consent was tantamount to an “ouster” from the Association’s laundry rooms and wrongful repossession of the laundry rooms by the Association. In legal terms, that is referred to as “unlawful detainer.” In defense, the Association argued that the disconnecting was not ouster and repossession because CSC’s washers and dryers were never removed from the laundry rooms.

The Court provided that there are three factors in an unlawful detainer action: (1) the plaintiff (CSC) was in peaceful possession of the premises (the laundry rooms); (2) the plaintiff (CSC) was ousted of actual possession of the premises (the laundry rooms); and (3) the defendant (the Association and Commercial Laundries) withheld possession of the premises (the laundry rooms) from the plaintiff (CSC) without consent or legal process.

Because CSC’s washers and dryers were never removed from the laundry rooms, the Court held that the action of disconnecting CSC’s washers and dryers and moving them to the side of the laundry rooms did not amount to ouster of CSC from its actual possession of the laundry rooms as required by an action for unlawful detainer. While the disconnecting and relocation of the washers and dryers may be a form of what the Court refers to as “constructive or useful dispossession,” unlawful detainer actions require actual dispossession, which did not occur in this case.

Laundry leases, while often quite short, are also often written in tiny print whose terms can even give an experienced lawyer a run for the money as to the lease’s long-term implications. The laundry lease makes up for its brevity with obnoxious long-term effects and difficult concepts for a layman to understand. With that in mind, this case demonstrates the need for the association’s lawyer to review all of the association’s contracts. Just because the lease is two pages long, this does not mean its financial implications are not extremely far reaching.

In any event, it is great to the see an association prevail against the laundry machine vendor!

A community association’s board of directors is often comprised of lay people who volunteer their precious free time for the needs of their association. At times, a board of directors or single director may make a poor decision, like entering into a dis-favorable contract based upon a mistake. While the contract may be otherwise valid, where a mistake is one that can be proven to be based upon unilateral mistake, the association might be able to void the contract. That said, doing so is an expensive, uphill battle.

Avoidance of a contract based upon unilateral mistake was recently discussed in the case of Thomas DePrince v. Starboard Cruise Services, Inc. decided by Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal on January 17, 2018. In this case, during a cruise, Thomas DePrince visited an onboard jewelry shop owned and operated by Starboard Cruise Services, Inc. (“Starboard”). DePrince expressed interest in purchasing a 15 to 20 carat loose diamond of particular color and clarity. Because the onboard shop did not have a diamond of this size, the shop’s manager contacted an onshore supplier for availability and pricing. The onshore supplier responded by e-mail providing that two diamonds meeting DePrince’s specifications were available, one 20.64 carat diamond for $235,000 and one 20.73 carat diamond for $245,000.

DePrince was advised by his expert gemologist sister that the diamonds should cost millions, not thousands, of dollars. She advised DePrince not to buy either diamond. Nevertheless, DePrince purchased the 20.64 carat diamond, paying Starboard’s quoted $235,000 price. Starboard later learned that the price it quoted to DePrince was the per-carat price for the diamond rather than the total price, which should have been $4,850,400. Starboard informed DePrince of the error and, on its own, reversed the charges on DePrince’s credit card to refund all monies paid. As a result, DePrince then sued Starboard, alleging claims for breach of contract, specific performance, and conversion.

The trial court found in Starboard’s favor based on its own defense of unilateral mistake using the “four-prong test” required to establish unilateral mistake. Under this test, an otherwise valid contract will be rescinded where the party seeking to avoid the contract has shown that:

1. the mistake was induced by the party seeking to benefit from the mistake;
2. there is no negligence or lack of due care on the part of the party seeking to avoid the contract;
3. denial of release from the contract would be inequitable; and
4. the position of the person benefiting from the mistake has not changed to the point where rescinding the contract would be unjust.

Here, the party seeking to avoid the contract is Starboard, and the party benefitting from the mistake is DePrince. With reference to prong 1 and prong 2, respectively, the trial court instructed the jury that the inducement could be satisfied by an omission on the part of DePrince and that there may be “some degree of negligence on the part of Starboard” so long as “there was no inexcusable lack of due care under the circumstances on its part.” Based upon these instructions, the jury found that Starboard should be released from the contract. DePrince was not pleased.

DePrince appealed the trial court’s decision to Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal. On appeal, the Court discussed DePrince’s duty to disclose to Starboard that it was making a mistake as to the price of the diamond. In a general commercial transaction, there is no duty to disclose facts that the other party could discover on its own with some due diligence. However, once a party begins to disclose certain facts, the whole truth must be disclosed. Therefore, “inducement” requires some type of action and cannot stand on an “omission.” Interestingly, because DePrince had no duty to disclose what he knew about the price of the diamond and did not trigger such duty by discussing any known facts about the price, the Court found that DePrince did not induce Starboard into making the mistake.

As to the application of prong 2, regarding negligence or lack of due care, it is clear from the four-prong test that there can be no negligence or lack of due care on the part of Starboard in order to satisfy this prong. However, the jury instruction allowed for some negligence on the part of Starboard in contravention of the established four-prong test.

As the satisfaction of prong 1 and prong 2 is a factual matter, the appellate Court determined that these findings are a matter best determined by the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings with adjusted jury instructions (in plain English, the term “remand” means “sent”).

So, in the event your association makes a mistake and by entering into a dis-favorable contract, it is possible for an association to void that contract based upon unilateral mistake where the facts satisfy the four-prong test discussed above. However, doing so would require costly and time-consuming litigation with no guarantee of success whatsoever. Therefore, it is a far better practice for the board of directors to ask questions of their contractors and vendors to become well informed as to what they are getting into and have all association contracts reviewed by the association’s legal counsel to avoid the mistake in the first place.

According to the American Heart Association, sudden cardiac arrest (“SCA”) is a leading cause of death in the United States. It is estimated that more than 350,000 lives are taken each year due to the abrupt loss of heart function. However, with technological advances, the number of deaths due to SCA have been lowered through the use of an automated external defibrillator (“AED”). An AED is a portable medical instrument that delivers an electrical impulse to the heart to disrupt and correct an otherwise fatal irregular heartbeat (arrhythmia) and allows a normal rhythm to resume. Although AEDs have been credited with saving countless lives by making it possible for non-medical individuals to respond to a medical emergency, the question must be asked: “Is the liability worth the risk?”

The purchase and availability of AEDs is controlled by state and federal laws and regulations. Pursuant to Florida law, AEDs are required to be installed in public schools, dental offices, and assisted living facilities. AEDs are optional in state parks and state owned or leased facilities. There is no requirement that community associations in Florida install AED devices on association property and/or association fitness facilities. Although not legally required, there is a growing trend of community associations considering installing AEDs on association property to better protect their residents. When considering whether or not to install an AED device, associations must ensure that all parties (i.e., association management, board of directors, residents, and any other authorized user) understand the potential liability associated with the use of an AED and the protections afforded to them under Florida law.
“The Cardiac Arrest Survival Act” (“Cardiac Act”) codified in section 768.1325 of the Florida Statutes was enacted by the Legislature in order to encourage consumer purchase, placement, and use of AEDs. The Cardiac Act only applies to situations in which an AED is used to resuscitate an individual. In situations not involving an AED, the “Good Samaritan Act” codified in section 768.13 of the Florida Statutes applies. The Good Samaritan Act provides that:

“Any person, including those licensed to practice medicine, who gratuitously and in good faith renders emergency care or treatment…at the scene of an emergency outside of a hospital, doctor’s office, or other place having proper medical equipment, without objection of the injured victim[s], shall not be held liable for any civil damages… where the person acts as an ordinary reasonably prudent person would have acted under the same or similar circumstances.”

The Cardiac Act shields the AED’s owner and its operator who used it in an effort to render aide from liability in the event of a perceived medical emergency. A perceived medical emergency occurs when a reasonable person believes that an individual is experiencing a life-threatening medical condition involving the heart that requires an immediate medical response. Pursuant to the Cardiac Act, the user of an AED is immune from liability for any resulting harm from the use or attempted use on the victim if:

1. There is a perceived medical emergency; and

2. No objection is made by the victim against the use of the device on their person.

The Cardiac Act further extends immunity to community associations organized under Chapters 617, 718, 719, 720, 721, and 723 of the Florida Statutes. However, the shield of immunity afforded to community associations can be pierced if the harm caused to the victim was due to the failure of the association to properly maintain and test the AED device. Additionally, immunity will not be granted to the association if the harm was due to the association’s failure to provide appropriate training to the employee or agent of the association when the employee or agent was the person who actually used the device on the victim. However, training by the association will not be required if any of the following is met:

1. The AED device is equipped with audible, visual, or written instructions on its use, including any such visual or written instructions posted on or adjacent to the device; OR

2. The employee or agent was not an employee or agent who would have been reasonably expected to use the device; OR

3. The period of time elapsing between the engagement of the person as an employee or agent and the occurrence of the harm, or between the acquisition of the device and the occurrence of the harm in any case in which the device was acquired after engagement of the employee or agent, was not a reasonably sufficient period in which to provide the training.

Even though training may not be required for one of the reasons set forth above, common sense dictates that any key personnel, such as the staff in charge of athletic activities and the manager, should be trained in the use of the AED device. In regard to where the AED should be installed, the Cardiac Act does not provide guidance. Again, common sense dictates it should be in a visible area. Also, an insurer cannot exclude damages resulting from the use of an AED from coverage under a general liability policy issued to the community association.
In relation to immunity extended to “the person,” the Cardiac Act further provides that the user will not be immune from liability if:

1. The harm was caused by user’s willful or criminal misconduct, gross negligence, reckless disregard or misconduct, or a conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of the victim who was harmed; OR

2. The person who used the AED on the victim is a licensed or certified health professional who used the AED device while acting within the scope of the license or certification of the professional and within the scope of the employment or agency of the professional; OR

3. The person is a hospital, clinic, or other entity whose primary purpose is providing health care directly to patients, and the harm was caused by an employee or agent of the entity who used the device while acting within the scope of the employment or agency of the employee or agent; OR

4. The person is an acquirer of the device who leased the device to a health care entity, or who otherwise provided the device to such entity for compensation without selling the device to the entity, and the harm was caused by an employee or agent of the entity who used the device while acting within the scope of the employment or agency of the employee or agent; OR

5. The person is the manufacturer of the device.

If an association decides to proceed with placement of an AED device on association property, then the board should adopt rules and regulations in the association’s governing documents which address the following: (1) the location of the AED device, (2) notification procedure should the AED be removed from its designated location to a secondary location on a temporary basis, (3) maintenance and testing of the AED, (4) authorized users, (5) training for the authorized users, (6) written instructions posted next to the device that provide a “how to” in case a trained user is not available, and (7) regular notice to the owners as to the AED device’s availability, location, and identification of trained staff and owners.

Any association that provides athletic activities for its members should seriously consider owning an AED device. Should you have any further questions about whether or not the liability is worth the risk, then contact your association’s attorney as to whether an AED is right for your association. Save a life by having an AED device available at your association!

As many people who live in communities operated by a community association know, one of the advantages, or disadvantages depending on who you ask, is that the association typically has the authority to regulate the improvements that are made by residents within the community. This authority will keep the purple house out of your neighborhood – good for those who would prefer to look out their window and not see a purple house, but bad for the person wanting the purple house. While most of the aesthetic qualities of a community can be regulated by the association through established architectural standards and guidelines that are set out in the community’s governing documents, the association is at times hamstrung by statutes or other regulations which govern certain improvements, such as solar panels, other energy saving devices and antennas.

Of topic in this article are satellite dish antennas which receive video programming signals from direct broadcast satellites, broadband radio service providers, and television broadcast stations. As directed by the United States Congress in Section 207 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the Federal Communications Commission adopted the Over-the-Air Reception Devices (“OTARD”) rule concerning governmental and nongovernmental restrictions on the viewers’ ability to receive these video programming signals to antennas, including direct-to-home satellite dishes that are less than one (1) meter in diameter, television antennas, and wireless cable antennas.

Under the OTARD rules, a resident has the right to install an antenna on property that the resident owns or over which the resident has exclusive use or control. In the case of a single-family home community, the right would extend over the lot as the lot is owned by the homeowner. In the case of condominiums and cooperatives, the OTARD rules apply to the unit and to the exclusive use areas, otherwise known as limited common elements, such as terraces, balconies, or patios.

As relevant to community associations, the OTARD rules prohibit restrictions that impair the installation, maintenance, or use of antennas used to receive video programming. Therefore, the OTARD rules prohibit most restrictions that (i) unreasonably delay or prevent installation, maintenance, or use; (ii) unreasonably increase the cost of installation, maintenance, or use; or (iii) preclude reception of an acceptable quality signal.

However, to the extent that an association’s regulations of satellite dish antennas may be accomplished without impairing reception of an acceptable quality signal, unreasonably preventing or delaying installation, maintenance, or use of a satellite dish, or unreasonably increasing the cost of installing, maintain, or using a satellite dish, the association would be able to create and enforce such regulations, especially where the need for the regulations are based upon express legitimate safety concerns and not merely for aesthetic reasons. For example, a regulation requiring that a satellite dish antenna be placed in a particular location on a house, such as the side or the rear of the house, might be permissible if this placement does not prevent reception of an acceptable quality signal or impose unreasonable expense or delay.

Additionally, as the OTARD rules are only applicable to property that a resident owns or over which the resident has exclusive use or control, these rules do not apply to common areas or common elements that are owned by a community association or jointly by condominium unit owners. Common areas and common elements typically include recreational facilities, the roof or exterior walls of a condominium or cooperative building, and right-of-ways. Therefore, an association may properly prohibit a resident from installing a satellite dish antenna on the association’s common areas or common elements which are not for the exclusive use of the resident. Even if a resident cannot receive an acceptable signal from the resident’s lot, unit, or area of exclusive use or control, the association is under no obligation to provide the resident with a location for the resident to install their antenna.

Further, the OTARD rules do not prohibit an association’s restrictions on satellite dish antennas which extend beyond the resident’s area of exclusive use or control when installed. For example, an association may impose restriction upon a satellite dish that extends beyond the balcony or patio of a unit to be over the common elements. Therefore, in order for the OTARD rules to protect the resident’s antenna, the antenna must be installed wholly within the exclusive use area.

Does your community association have restrictions regarding satellite dishes and other antennas? If so, you may want to have your association’s attorney review these restrictions to ensure that they meet the requirements of the OTARD rules.

At issue in today’s column is a subject we recently addressed regarding whether an association must record its assessment lien in the public records of the County in which the community is located in order for it to be effective and whether such lien relates back to the initial date of recording of the declaration. At least, as to a surplus that results from a tax foreclosure sale, the answer, in most circumstances, is that the association does not need to record its assessment lien in order to argue entitlement to the surplus, and the lien will relate back to the date of initial recording of the declaration, as was the outcome of a recent Fourth District Court of Appeal case, Calendar v. Stonebridge Gardens Section III Condominium Association, Inc., decided December 17, 2017.

In this case, Mrs. Calendar was the unit owner who lost her home as a result of a tax foreclosure. After the foreclosure sale, Mrs. Calendar asserted that she, and not the condominium association, was entitled to the surplus that resulted from the tax foreclosure sale. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s decision to award the surplus to the condominium association. In so doing, the appellate court cited section 718.116(5)(a), Florida Statutes (2016), which provides:

“The association has a lien on each condominium parcel to secure the payment of assessments. … [T]he lien is effective from and shall relate back to the recording of the original declaration of condominium, or, in the case of lien on a parcel located in a phase condominium, the last to occur of the recording of the original declaration or amendment thereto creating the parcel. However, as to first mortgages of record, the lien is effective from and after recording of a claim of lien in the public records of the county in which the condominium parcel is located…”

This type of lien is referred to as a “statutory lien,” and based on this statutory provision, the Appellate Court reasoned that the recording an assessment lien was not an absolute prerequisite to the enforcement of the lien for unpaid assessments, so long as the declaration of condominium was recorded, which it obviously was, and so long as a first mortgage was not at issue, which it was not.

As an aside, with the aforementioned in mind, if a declaration of condominium was recorded before April 1, 1992, then the statutory assessment lien does not apply because the relevant statute did not yet exist. In those situations, the declaration of condominium can be amended to include a provision similar to the statutory lien. Alternatively, subjecting the declaration of condominium to Chapter 718, Florida Statutes, “as amended from time to time,” a phrase otherwise known as “Kaufman” language, would incorporate the statutory lien provisions, as well as all other substantive changes to Chapter 718, Florida Statutes.

Homeowners’ associations have a similar statutory lien which also relates back to the date of initial recording of the declaration of covenants. However, the statutory lien does not apply to a homeowners’ association community’s declaration recorded prior to July 1, 2008. Prior to July 1, 2008, (absent any specific language in the association’s declaration indicating that the assessment lien relates back to the date the declaration was recorded), a prior recorded mortgage lien had priority, as was decided by the Florida Supreme Court in 1995 in the case of Holly Lake Association v. Federal National Mortgage Association. The relevant section 720.3085, Florida Statutes, was amended and became effective on July 1, 2008 which codified the current assessment lien relation back principle. Therefore, as to those HOA communities whose declarations were recorded previously, in order to have assessment lien rights which relate back to the date the declaration was initially recorded, the declaration of covenants must be amended to include a provision similar to the text of the statutory lien statute; or, in the alternative, the declaration of covenants may be made subject to Chapter 720, Florida Statutes, “as amended from time to time,” (a/k/a Kaufman language) thereby incorporating the relation back provision, as well as all other substantive changes to Chapter 720, Florida Statutes.

The Stonebridge case can also be used to assert priority of an unrecorded association assessment lien over many other types of liens, too, such a mechanics’ lien recorded against a unit/home by an unpaid contractor. Nevertheless, with the aforementioned mind, it is always better to be safe than sorry. Therefore, taking the time, and sometimes extra step, to record the association‘s assessment lien all but guarantees the priority of the association’s assessment lien.

An association member wants to review the association’s lawyer’s bills sent to the association over the past year. As a result, the member submits a written request to access those records. But, is the member actually entitled to see them? Pursuant to the relevant sections of Chapter 718, Chapter 719, and Chapter 720 of the Florida Statutes, regarding condominiums, cooperatives, and homeowners’ associations, respectively, all members (or their authorized representatives) have the right to access their community association’s official records for inspection and copying. However, this right is not absolute as there are several official records which are exempt from member access.

Among these exempted official records are records protected by the attorney-client privilege, as described in section 90.502, Florida Statutes, and any record protected by the work-product privilege. Generally, the attorney-client privilege protects communications between a lawyer and the lawyer’s client; whereas, the work-product privilege protects, for example, a record prepared by an association attorney or prepared at the attorney’s express direction which reflects a mental impression, conclusion, litigation strategy, or legal theory of the attorney or the association and which was prepared exclusively for civil or criminal litigation or for adversarial administrative proceedings or which was prepared in anticipation of litigation or proceedings until the conclusion of the litigation or proceedings.

While these exceptions to official records access are expressly provided in the relevant sections of the Florida Statutes, questions arise as to whether or not a community association’s legal invoices are protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or the work-product privilege. Moreover, can the association redact its legal invoices to keep privileged information provided in the legal invoices from access by the member? You bet the association can!

This issue was decided in the arbitration case of Jandebeur v. Marine Terrace Association, Inc. (Arbo. Case No. 2014-03-5716) in which the association, in the end, was represented by Kaye Bender Rembaum, Attorneys at Law. (This case involved a cooperative under Chapter 719, Florida Statutes, which is substantially the same as Chapter 718, Florida Statutes. Arbitration is not applicable to Chapter 720, Florida Statutes.) The law firm took the case over from the association’s prior counsel who, on behalf of his client-association, advised the board not to provide access to his law firm’s billing to the association, claiming the entire bill to be privileged.

In this case, the member made written requests to inspect the association’s official records, including legal invoices from the association’s prior law firm. Upon the advice of the association’s prior attorney, the association refused to provide the owner with access to the requested legal invoices claiming that they were inaccessible, in their entirety, because they contained attorney-client privileged communications and attorney work-product.

In deciding the matter in favor of the member, the arbitrator held that refusing access to the entire legal invoices was improper; however, the arbitrator made it patently clear that “[i]f attorney work product is contained in an invoice, e.g. a description of work performed reveals the attorney’s thoughts, etc., regarding the litigation, that information may be redacted.” Therefore, the arbitrator in this case clearly and expressly opined that portions of legal invoices may be redacted to remove information protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or the work-product privilege.

Given the official records exemptions from member access as discussed above, the arbitrator’s decision in this case is in line with the statutory exemptions provided by the relevant sections of Chapter 718, Chapter 719, and Chapter 720 of the Florida Statutes. Therefore, do not be surprised if, upon a member’s written request to inspect the association’s law firm’s billing, invoices are presented only after significant redaction to protect both attorney-client and work-product privileges.

While arbitration cases decided by the Arbitration Section of Florida’s Department of Business and Professional Regulations, Division of Florida Condominiums, Timeshares, and Mobile Homes, do not create binding precedents on any other parties (meaning, the same issue could be decided differently in another case) and are not applicable to homeowners’ associations, they are often relied upon for guidance, as many community association attorneys do. Therefore, when presented with a written request for access to your association’s legal invoices, you may want to have your association’s attorney review the requested invoices to see if there is any privileged information which should be redacted to protect the privilege prior to the member’s inspection and copying of the official records.